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Austen Chamberlain was one of the longest serving foreign secretaries of the 
twentieth century, remaining in office from October 1924 until the General Election 
in the early summer of 1929.  His tenure coincided with the demise of the Geneva 
Protocol, the signature of the Treaty of Locarno, a major disarmament conference in 
Geneva, crisis in the Far East and a deterioration of Britain’s relations with the United 
States.1  By the time the second Baldwin government fell from office in the wake of 
the economic crisis caused by the Wall Street Crash, the diplomatic landscape was 
very different from that which had existed when Chamberlain had arrived at the 
Foreign Office.  In particular, Britain had become party to two pacts that not only 
outlawed war but contained a commitment to use military might to enforce them.  
This was a remarkable departure from the more cautious approach of Chamberlain’s 
predecessors, both before and after the First World War.  They had been reluctant to 
allow Britain to offer concrete promises of assistance to her European neighbours in 
the event of invasion or war.  Britain had, of course, been one of the founding 
members of the League of Nations, whose Covenant relied on the concept of 
collective security to operate effectively.2  But by the mid 1920s, crises such as that 
caused by Mussolini’s annexation of Corfu in 1923, had demonstrated that this system 
for ensuring the satisfactory resolution of disputes between states could not be relied 
upon.3   
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 At the heart of the discussion about the effectiveness of the League as a keeper 
of the peace during the 1920s and the wider diplomatic initiatives of Chamberlain’s 
Foreign Secretaryship is Britain’s relationship with France.  Indeed, few would 
disagree that that relationship is central to understanding Chamberlain’s own views on 
foreign policy between 1924-1929.  A man often criticised for inconsistency in many 
of policies, Chamberlain’s Francophile inclinations were a unvarying feature of his 
diplomacy.4  To his sister, Ida, he referred to ‘our pleasant relationship’ with France.5  
To diplomats, he used stronger language.  British foreign policy should be structured 
around the need to ‘remove the acute fears which distort French policy and reinforce 
French confidence in Britain’.6  Nevertheless, within this wide acceptance of 
Chamberlain’s pro-French sympathies, there are differences of opinion and of 
emphasis.  In the early 1960s, Douglas Johnson portrayed Chamberlain as being so 
fanatically pro-French that he was almost guilty of ignoring British relations with 
other key European powers.7  A generation later, Chamberlain’s biographer, David 
Dutton, suggested that his subject’s French sympathies were more subtle and complex 
but that he also derived considerable moral support from the fundamentally pro-
French Foreign Office of the time.8  Dutton’s portrayal of Chamberlain as a more 
moderate Francophile has, in turn been challenged in recent years by Richard 
Grayson.  The latter’s argument centres on the premise that hitherto, historians have 
placed far too much emphasis on Chamberlain’s French sensibilities.9  Grayson’s 
Chamberlain is the quintessential ‘honest broker’ – pro-European rather than 
specifically pro-French, whose diplomacy was rooted in the argument that the way to 
secure lasting peace in Europe was by a according the same status to the diplomatic 
needs of the Germans as to those of France and Britain.10  This is a point of view that 
the present author has taken some issue with, specifically in relationship to 
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Chamberlain’s relationship with and attitude to the views of Lord D’Abernon, the 
British ambassador to Berlin between 1920 and 1926, during the negotiations of the 
Treaty of Locarno.11  Viewed from this perspective, Chamberlain appears to be 
somewhere between the assessments of Dutton and Douglas Johnson.  
This article broadens this analysis to examine Chamberlain’s attitude towards 
France throughout the entire period of his Foreign Secretaryship.  It will focus on four 
key events.  The first of these is the link between the Geneva Protocol of 1924 and the 
security negotiations of the following year.12  The Protocol had been proposed by 
Chamberlain’s predecessor at the Foreign Office, Ramsay MacDonald and his French 
opposite number, Edouard Herriot, to toughen up the wording of the League of 
Nations’ Covenant to include a more precise definition of what constituted an act of 
aggression and to introduce a compulsory system of diplomatic arbitration.  The 
agreement also involved the British government in making more clearly-defined 
commitments to maintain French security from aggression; a feature that contributed to 
the decision of the Baldwin government, which succeeded the MacDonald 
administration in October 1924, to abandon it.  Or at least to seek an alternative way of 
achieving a similar effect but by commandeering support for a multi-lateral security 
pact that did not require the British to act as sole guarantors of French territorial 
integrity in the event of invasion or war.  The result was the second, and in many 
respects, the most important area of Chamberlain’s Anglo-French diplomacy – the 
negotiation of the Treaty of Locarno in October 1925.  This pact guaranteed the 
German frontier with France and Belgium as it had been defined by the Treaty of 
Versailles six years earlier, contained a promise that the signatory powers would not go 
to war for ten years, secured German membership of the League of Nations and 
undertook to step up efforts for a workable international agreement on disarmament.  
 3
The first year of Chamberlain’s period as Foreign Secretary represented the time when 
his pro-French sympathies are most evident and when his close rapport with his French 
opposite number, Aristide Briand, was at its height, and which observers were 
convinced was mutual.13  Indeed, Chamberlain’s views on the Geneva Protocol and on 
the Locarno treaty represent the time when he was most confident of the Anglo-French 
relationship.  The second two examples – the diplomacy surrounding the so-called 
Anglo-French Compromise on disarmament in 1928 and the implications to Britain of 
the Kellogg-Briand Pact the same year – deal with an Anglo-French relationship that 
was undergoing a partial realignment.  The difference between perceived and actual 
diplomatic influence is also at the heart of the discussion of Chamberlain’s post-
Locarno diplomacy towards France, especially in his reaction to Briand’s decision to 
lead negotiations of a pact to outlaw war permanently with the American Secretary of 
State, Frank Kellogg.  The present author has written elsewhere that we still know 
disproportionately more about the first year of Chamberlain’s foreign Secretaryship 
than we do about the remaining four.14  While it is undoubtedly necessary to recognise 
the importance of his role in the negotiation of the Treaty of Locarno - and this article 
gives due credit to this - this still remains the case.  This article attempts to continue the 
process of rebalance.   
It is important to realise that Chamberlain’s Francophile tendencies did not 
stem merely from the opportunities that presented themselves when he was Foreign 
Secretary, but from a life-long love affair with the country, its culture and its 
language.15  As a young man, he had studied at the prestigious Ecole des Sciences 
Politiques in Paris, where he had heard lectures given by Albert Sorel.16  To 
Chamberlain, France was simply the most sophisticated country in Continental 
Europe; a much older country politically than Italy and Germany and in possession of 
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a clearer national identity.  As Beaverbrook sarcastically noted, Chamberlain was 
‘keener on the side of the French than the French premier…’.17  France was, in short, 
the European power most like Britain; an association made all the more powerful by 
the relative geographical proximity of the two countries.  Britain and France had a 
long tradition of democracy and had fought against autocracy during the First World 
War in a way that had forged an unprecedented degree of co-operation and 
understanding between the two countries.  To Chamberlain, an Anglo-French 
diplomatic alliance as the basis of maintaining peace and the democratic tradition 
after the war was the logical extension of this.18  The consequences of not doing so 
were, he argued, unimaginable.  A memorandum about his grand vision for Britain’s 
relations with France, written less than a month after his arrival at the Foreign Office, 
makes this clear.   
If the Geneva Protocol falls through,…the whole question of 
French security will be re-opened; and if we do not show the 
French that we are still prepared to consider it with every 
desire to reach a satisfactory conclusion, we may expect 
renewed accusations of bad faith from France, with a 
consequent deterioration of Anglo-French relations and a 
possible renewal of the nightmarish happenings of the past five 
years.19 
Reflecting on this period twenty years later, Chamberlain identified an even greater 
bond between the British and the French: ‘The deeper Englishmen and Frenchmen 
penetrate into each other’s nature’, he argued, ‘the more they will find they have in 
common…’.20  The aspirations of other European powers lacked the simple 
straightforwardness of the French.  Chamberlain lacked the patience to penetrate the 
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psychology behind Mussolini’s foreign policy and the very different intellect of the 
German Minister for Foreign Affairs, Gustav Stresemann.21  Many discussions of 
Chamberlain’s Foreign Secretaryship quote the observation that he loved France ‘like 
a woman’; that he remained pro-French despite recognising that French demands for 
additional protection from invasion were not always rational.22  This article supports 
this point of view, although it also illustrates that Chamberlain himself would have 
preferred French policy to be less fickle and more consistently rooted in improving 
relations with Britain. 
Traditionally, of course, consideration of foreign policy issues was not the 
province of the Cabinet.  Since the First World War, this balance had been difficult to 
achieve, but both Chamberlain and Baldwin were anxious that, where possible, this 
arrangement should be maintained.  It would be wrong to claim that this meant that 
Chamberlain was allowed to develop a personal style of diplomacy unfettered by his 
colleagues in government.  But he undoubtedly enjoyed greater freedom than other 
members of the Cabinet in placing his individual imprint on the priorities of his 
department.  And unlike Lord Curzon, the last Conservative Foreign Secretary, 
Chamberlain did not have to endure the interventions of a Prime Minister with a 
strong interest in international diplomacy.23  This was just as well, as Chamberlain’s 
ideas were radically more pro-French than those of Curzon and his predecessors, and 
were often at odds with those of his Cabinet colleagues.  On Chamberlain’s arrival at 
the Foreign Office, the British government was wedded to the nineteenth century 
view that when it came to involvement in European diplomacy, Britain’s interests 
were usually best served by a policy of studied, partial detachment.24  This, 
Chamberlain argued, was fundamentally wrong-headed.  In a speech in the House of 
Commons in March 1925, he stated: 
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At periods in our history we have sought to withdraw ourselves 
from all European interests.  No nation can live, as we live, 
within twenty miles of the shores of the Continent of Europe 
and remain indifferent to the peace and security of the 
Continent.  It is more important today than ever before that we 
should regard ourselves as so protected and so separated from 
the rest of Europe and its misfortunes…as to remain indifferent 
to what happens, and callous and deaf to any appeal for help.25 
Predictably, Chamberlain received little support for this line of argument 
within the Cabinet.  During the debate about the workability of the Geneva Protocol, 
Chamberlain’s proactive pro-French inclinations came under attack.  Despite what has 
been claimed elsewhere, Chamberlain did not reject the agreement because it 
appeared insufficient to French security needs.26  To him, by enhancing the power of 
the League, ipso facto, the Anglo-French relationship became strengthened because it 
was the working relationship between these countries that drove the diplomatic 
agenda of that organisation.  At the same time, the Protocol offered the perfect 
reassurance to those wedded to a less proactive role in foreign affairs because it 
reinforced the idea of collective security and therefore collective (not exclusively 
British) action should war break out.  But despite this, even the great League 
champion, Viscount Cecil of Chelwood, who was in favour of the Protocol, objected 
to the way in which Chamberlain was using the negotiations to place particular 
emphasis on French security.  ‘[W]e hear a great deal about the necessity for French 
security’, he wrote, but ‘the necessity for security for some other nations in Europe 
seems no less essential to peace’.27  Their Cabinet colleague, the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, Winston Churchill, also rejected the ‘axiom that our fate is invariably 
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linked to that of France’.28  Even three years later, when Chamberlain’s reputation as 
an international statesman was more assured, he felt compelled to lament: ‘…I have 
been disappointed at receiving so little support from some of my colleagues and 
having my informed and considered opinions swept aside so lightly by them…[They] 
don’t know what I know of the state of Europe and how thin the crust is on which I 
have to tread’.29   
Nor could Baldwin’s patronage entirely protect Chamberlain from other 
influential critics of his preferred policies.  His instincts for a bilateral security 
agreement with France to build on the closer relationship proposed by the Geneva 
Protocol extended only later to include Germany, caused him to fall foul of the 
Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) during the early months of 1925.30  This 
important group of predominantly Conservative grandees, which included the former 
Foreign Secretary, Curzon, raised different objections to Chamberlain’s Cabinet 
colleagues.  In particular, Chamberlain was accused of not paying sufficient heed to 
the text of the German note that had been dispatched to London and to Paris in 
February resurrecting an earlier plan for a security agreement between Britain, France 
and Germany – ‘a three-handed game’, as he termed it - in which the signatory 
powers undertook not to wage war for a generation.31  After this date, because of the 
intervention of the CID, Chamberlain was compelled to abandon his plans for a 
bilateral pact between Britain and France in favour of a multilateral agreement.  But 
the disappointment does not appear to have had a devastating effect on Chamberlain, 
although he never accepted that it was the best course of action.32  However, in 1925, 
his reaction was stoic and was founded in the reasoning that any security pact as long 
as it included Britain and France, would serve his purpose.  In this respect, he was 
indeed, as Self has argued, a Realpolitiker.33   
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Chamberlain’s comments about the connection between the Geneva Protocol 
and what became the Locarno pact discussed above, also reveal another important 
point: that at the beginning of 1925, Chamberlain not only saw the Anglo-French 
relationship as being of great importance and potential but that he believed it to be 
weak not strong.34  Furthermore, he was faced with a situation where one of the 
defeated powers at the end of the First World War, Germany, appeared to have a 
clearer and more coherent strategy for moving forward the European security agenda 
than Britain and France.   But it is debatable whether Chamberlain’s response to this 
was to step up his personal contact with Briand.35  While it is true that he savoured 
the opportunity to talk to Briand at Geneva when they gathered for League Assembly 
and Council meetings, much of Chamberlain’s communication with the Fren
government concerning the negotiation of the security pact was done by conventional 
diplomatic channels, through the Marquess of Crewe, the British ambassador to Paris, 
and through Crewe’s opposite number, Aimé de Fleuriau.
ch 
36  Indeed the impact that 
Chamberlain’s relationship with these two men had on Anglo-French relations in the 
mid 1920s is an important gap in our knowledge of Locarno diplomacy.  That said, it 
would be wrong to suggest that Chamberlain believed that Briand played an 
insignificant role in shaping French security policy during the Locarno negotiations.  
Chamberlain greeted every response by Briand as each round of the security 
negotiations progressed as the start of a ‘new chapter’ in Anglo-French relations.37  
On conclusion of the Locarno treaty, Chamberlain generously celebrated the efforts of 
his friend.  ‘No praise is too high for the part played by Briand…His courage, his 
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statesmanship, and the generosity and liberality of his mind, made possible what with 
any lesser man might have seemed an impossibility’.38   
 The Locarno agreements were intended to herald a new dawn in European 
diplomacy, not merely for supporters of an Anglo-French security entente.  They were 
also intended to pave the way for further agreements that would reinforce the desire 
for peace and to lay the ghosts of the residual hostilities after the First World War 
further to rest.  But as Jon Jacobson and others have demonstrated, that did not 
happen.39  So what went wrong?  The answer as far as Chamberlain was concerned is 
again related to the concepts of actual and perceived influence.  Chamberlain believed 
that his role in the conclusion of the Locarno pact had secured his reputation not only 
as Foreign Secretary but as an international statesman.  This was not an unreasonable 
assumption, especially as he was awarded the Nobel Prize for peace in 1925, with 
Stresemann and Briand being similarly honoured a year later in recognition of their 
part in securing the Locarno pact.  Yet, despite this, neither his contemporaries nor 
subsequent generations of historians appear to have viewed Chamberlain as a 
significant player in European diplomacy for most of the rest of his time in office.  It 
would be wrong, of course, to claim that before 1924 that Chamberlain had lacked 
political presence and influence.  But somehow, assessments of his period at the 
Foreign Office seem to have been tainted by the knowledge that had he not resigned 
the Conservative party leadership in 1922, he would have been Premier not Foreign 
Secretary between 1924 and 1929.  That said, Chamberlain himself undoubtedly 
viewed the years of his Foreign Secretaryship as the high point of his career.40  
Nevertheless, both Briand and Stresemann had been the equivalent of Prime Minister 
before assuming the mantles of foreign minister, (although Stresemann has justly 
always been remembered more for his years at the Auswärtiges Amt than his period as 
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Chancellor).  Neither came to Locarno with a reputation tainted by missed 
opportunity and misjudgement.   
 But there were also other factors at work.  Another point that mitigated against 
Chamberlain’s desire to keep alive a rapport with the French was that he failed to 
realise that his relationship with Briand during the Locarno negotiations was the 
exception rather than the rule when it came to Britain’s relations with France.  The 
concept of an ‘Entente Cordiale’ was always perceived by the Foreign Office as an 
ironic term; that for the most part Britain’s relationship with France was not close and 
harmonious.  
In reality, during the Locarno negotiations, the relationship between 
Chamberlain and Briand flourished because it was in the interest of both parties and 
the diplomatic circumstances were auspicious for it to do so.  However, after 1925, 
other factors entered the equation that disrupted this equilibrium.  The crisis affecting 
British interests in the opium trade in China and the Far East forced Chamberlain to 
give European affairs lower priority.  But even then, Chamberlain did not lose sight of 
the British entente with France, as he feared that the two countries might be 
compelled to pursue separate policies that it might undermine their relationship.41  He 
also became increasingly overwhelmed by the proceedings of the Geneva 
Disarmament Conference in 1927 which threatened to impose more restrictions on the 
level of assistance that Britain could offer France in the event of an invasion of 
French territory.  Locarno diplomacy was now fraught with tension.  So much so that 
by 1927 Chamberlain was describing his meetings with Stresemann and Briand as 
‘combats’.42   
Once again, we return to the concepts of perceived and actual influence.  
During the final years of his Foreign Secretaryship, Chamberlain’s principal interests 
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in European diplomacy were disarmament and the quest to secure permanent peace.  
For the most part, these were also the objectives of Briand and to a lesser extent, 
Stresemann.  A further example of the difference between real and perceived 
influence in Chamberlain’s diplomacy was his misjudgement concerning the so-called 
Anglo-French Compromise on Armaments in the spring of 1928.  The origins of the 
compromise lay in the deadlock that had existed in the League’s Preparatory 
Commission on Disarmament since the end of 1926.  This hiatus was caused by a 
conflict between British desire to limit fleets on the basis of battleship size and French 
plans to calculate the reduction on the basis of tonnage. 43 There were also differences 
between the two powers on the issue of army conscription, with the French favouring 
its retention and the British favouring its abandonment.  At Geneva in March 1928, 
Chamberlain had given Briand a clear indication that if France would give way on the 
naval question, Britain would agree to allow the French to retain conscription.  This 
disastrous move immediately antagonised the Germans whose recent history with 
France had taught them that the French were willing to use their large conscript army 
to invade Germany in the event of German default of the terms of the Treaty of 
Versailles.  And since the Ruhr crisis, the additional sanction of the Locarno treaty 
had been created.  In the weeks that followed, Chamberlain displayed a remarkable 
degree of insensitivity to German concerns.  In his mind, he was quite clear that it had 
been the Germans who were providing the obstacle to the success of the disarmament 
negotiations.44  In words hardly resonating with the ‘spirit of Locarno’, in June 1928 
Chamberlain wrote: ‘Unless we make some progress in the question of disarmament 
we shall be faced inevitably by Germany’s repudiation of the disarmament provisions 
of the Treaty of Versailles, with what consequences for the immediate or future peace 
of the world I cannot at this moment pretend to predict.’45   
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The Americans were also annoyed by the Foreign Secretary’s willingness to 
alter the outcome of the Washington Naval Conference seven years earlier without 
reference to the other signatory powers.46  Yet by the end of July 1928, despite 
Cabinet opposition, especially from Walter Bridgeman, First Lord of the Admiralty, 
which he eventually overcame through support from Baron Cushenden and the 
Marquess of Salisbury, Chamberlain was authorised to sign the compromise proposal 
document with Briand.   Some have expressed surprise at the lack of Cabinet interest 
in what Chamberlain was trying to achieve, especially given the delicacy of the 
diplomatic situation, especially in regard to the United States.47  And it would be 
tempting to view this situation as an example of Chamberlain imposing his personal 
authority on the development of the Anglo-French relationship.  Chamberlain himself 
certainly wished that this had been the case.  But as his comments discussed earlier 
suggest, despite his established reputation as an international statesman, after 1925 
Chamberlain continued to fail to command the confidence of his Cabinet colleagues.  
 On 30 July 1928, Chamberlain announced the Anglo-French compromise in a 
speech in the House of Commons.48  The agreement was immediately denounced in 
the press as a ‘betrayal’ rather than a ‘concession’ to the French.49  For those who 
believe that Chamberlain’s diplomacy was rooted in a desire to broker personal 
agreements with the French, the Anglo-French Compromise has been seen as an 
example of the continuation of this strategy after his Locarno success.50  In contrast, 
scholars of the disarmament negotiations of the late 1920s are inclined to suggest that 
Chamberlain’s relations with Briand were less convivial and that he concluded the 
Compromise to foster Anglo-French co-operation over the League’s role in brokering 
a disarmament agreement.51  It is claimed that this was because Chamberlain believed 
that in the summer of 1928, Anglo-French relations were at their lowest ebb since the 
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Ruhr crisis.52  This latter view is too extreme.  In 1923, the crisis surrounding the 
occupation of the Ruhr, in which the British and French had conspicuously failed to 
support each other, had brought Europe to the brink of potential war.53  There was no 
situation of comparable severity between 1924 and 1929.  What there was after 1925 
was a gradual change of emphasis within the Entente, particularly in Paris; but never a 
major rift.  Briand, in particular, wished to keep his diplomatic options as open and as 
varied as possible, to include negotiation with the United States as well as with the 
European powers.  Indeed, the records of the British commissioners on disarmament 
in the mid 1920s suggest that the Anglo-French Compromise was concluded because 
Chamberlain was anxious to secure agreement with the French on disarmament 
because intelligence received from Sir Esme Howard, the British ambassador in 
Washington, suggested that the French and Americans were on the verge of signing a 
similar agreement themselves and that it would exclude Britain.54   
Further evidence that the Anglo-French relationship underwent a process of 
realignment rather than radical deterioration can be seen through an examination of 
the extent to which Chamberlain was excluded from the wider debate about 
disarmament and security between 1925 and 1929.  Chamberlain’s correspondence 
with Howard makes it clear that the Foreign Secretary was concerned that Kellogg did 
not understand the ‘special relationship’ that existed between Britain and France.55  
During the negotiation of the second and more important diplomatic agreement of 
1928, the Kellogg-Briand Pact – the Franco-American construct Chamberlain had 
been so concerned about during the Compromise negotiations - the authors made it 
clear that the Locarno powers would be asked to comment on drafts of the agreement 
before it was finally concluded.  Chamberlain frequently received copies of the 
diplomatic correspondence that flew between Paris and Washington concerning the 
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pact.  Furthermore, Chamberlain received excellent intelligence from Howard and 
from Crewe about the strategic thinking of the American and French governments on 
these issues.  But what is important is how Chamberlain felt about Britain’s new role 
of relative as opposed to central diplomatic importance.  His policies did not contain 
the bitterness of a jilted lover, to extend the simile used earlier of Chamberlain loving 
France as a woman.  Instead he adopted a pragmatic approach that centred on 
ensuring that the interests of the other Locarno powers were adequately represented 
during the Kellogg-Briand negotiations.  Consequently, it was at this time, and not 
during the preliminary negotiations of the Locarno Pact, that Chamberlain sought and 
found a modus vivendi with Stresemann.56  The man who had expressed profound 
scepticism at the German role in the negotiation of the 1925 treaty was now 
describing his German opposite number as his ‘good friend’ and the ‘strongest of 
allies’.57   
But too much should not be made of this warmer relationship with 
Stresemann.  The highly successful loan system between Germany and the United 
States that had been established under the terms of the Dawes Plan, created a bond 
between the two countries that had the potential at least to extend into a wider system 
of commercial and fiscal agreements.  While American financial aid was also offered 
to the French to help prop up their ailing currency in the late 1920s, the main 
economic axis nevertheless ran from Washington to the German capital.  The 
recovery of reparations payments, which the Dawes Plan was supposed to ensure, was 
still of vital importance to the British and French economies.  Nevertheless, the high-
profile economic role of the United States in European affairs exposed another area of 
disagreement between the governments in London and in Paris.  Throughout his 
period as Foreign Secretary, Chamberlain viewed the United States as the power that 
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had let down the entente alliance after the First World War by refusing to sign the 
Treaty of Versailles and join the League of Nations.  This existence of such 
diplomatic selfishness was confirmed to him by the willingness of the American 
government to show much greater levels of economic benevolence to its former 
enemy after 1924 than it had to its allies concerning the repayment of war debts.  The 
Kellogg-Briand pact was therefore little more than an opportunity for the American 
government to reinforce those economic links politically and strategically.58  Yet 
Briand believed that by working with the Americans rather than against them could 
prove advantageous, especially if France’s borders came under attack again.  It was 
therefore Briand who was more inclined than Chamberlain to overlook previous 
American diplomatic transgressions.  Different priorities thus made agreement 
between the British and French about the desirability of American involvement in 
matters relating to security unlikely.  A detailed discussion of Briand’s diplomatic 
priorities is beyond the remit of this article, but in emphasising his enthusiasm for 
American involvement in international diplomacy, it is important to note that the 
French foreign minister did not abandon his Locarno allies after 1925.  His interest in 
and commitment to European integration is well known and his status as one of the 
founding fathers of the European Union is widely accepted.59  As the present author 
has written elsewhere, in many respects, it is Briand who deserves to be seen as the 
quintessential Locarno statesmen; going further than Chamberlain, Stresemann or 
Mussolini to ensure a lasting legacy of European peace.60  
It is ironic given the importance that Chamberlain himself placed on his role in 
the conclusion of the Locarno pact that it was his reaction to the negotiation of the 
Kellogg-Briand pact that reveals more about his general diplomatic strategy 
concerning France on issues other than simply security.  In particular, these 
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negotiations revealed that, like his forebears at the Foreign Office, Chamberlain 
believed in balance of power diplomacy and in the creation of spheres of influence.  
In the summer of 1928, Chamberlain demanded that as a condition of British 
signature of the pact to outlaw war, Briand and Kellogg should acknowledge the right 
of the British government to maintain special influence in areas of the world of 
strategic importance to Britain.  He wanted a ‘British Monroe Doctrine’.61  In 
particular, he was anxious to guard British interests in Egypt and the Suez Canal 
region.62  Thus we have a continuity with the rationale for the original Entente 
Cordiale agreement of 1904 – an understanding concerning spheres of influence and 
one born more out of mutual diplomatic mistrust and jockeying for position than from 
a deep-rooted desire to work together.  As in 1904, in 1928, the British government 
was concerned about the impact of French foreign policy on British strategic interests.  
And as in 1904 also, it was speculation about German motives that coloured both 
British and French thinking. 
Like most of his generation, Chamberlain’s understanding of how to conduct 
diplomacy included the concept of the sphere of influence, especially the maintenance 
of British interests in this way.  However, it is also possible to view Chamberlain’s 
general approach to improving relations with France during his period at the helm of 
the Foreign Office as being partly concerned with a similar defensive phenomenon.  
Indeed, it is possible to see his Francophile tendencies as being fuelled partly by a 
desire to capitalise on French diplomatic associations with the successor states in 
Eastern Europe; a region not normally within the British sphere of influence.  
Through France the link would be created but one which Britain would not be directly 
tied to maintaining.  When the Little Entente powers expressed concerns about the 
impact of the Kellogg-Briand Pact on their relationship with France, Chamberlain 
 17
indicated that handling any diplomatic fallout would be French, not British 
responsibility.  As he told Howard, it was not the British government’s role to ‘defend 
or explain the French position’.63  When pressed by Viscount Chilton on the same 
issue a few months later, Chamberlain was even more direct: ‘it is true that we share 
certain obligations and rights under the Covenant of the League and Treaty of 
Locarno with France as also indeed with Germany but policy of His Majesty’s 
Government will be guided entirely by consideration for British and Imperial interests 
and obligations’.64   
The Locarno treaty five years earlier can also be seen as a statement of British 
and French balance of power diplomacy; linking as it did German signature of the 
treaty to membership of the British and French-dominated League of Nations.65  At 
the same time, the French were not entirely to be trusted.  The United States was also 
recognised by Chamberlain and Briand as a player of balance of power diplomacy 
through the development of the Dawes and Young Plan loans to Germany and the 
loans to the French to prop up the ailing franc prior to and during the Ruhr crisis.  
Chamberlain realised that British interests needed to be safeguarded should the 
French or Germans decide to offer an open door to greater American involvement in 
European affairs.  Nor did this necessarily imply that the British government intended 
to pursue a policy of peace at all costs despite what compliance with the terms of the 
Kellogg-Briand Pact would entail.  As Chamberlain told Howard: ‘our position in the 
world requires us, even in the altered circumstances in which modern warfare and 
modern commerce are conducted, to maintain as hithertofore belligerent rights at as 
high a level as possible’.66   
While Briand saw every advantage to concluding a pact to outlaw war with 
Kellogg, or the Pact of Paris as it became known, it was to be Chamberlain who was 
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to have a clearer perception of how the pact would affect the conduct of European 
diplomacy.67  By January 1928, it was also apparent that Chamberlain was concerned 
that sharing centre stage with the Americans during the Pact negotiations could go to 
Briand’s head, leading to an increasingly bullish French foreign policy.  The French 
Minister for Foreign Affairs might be tempted to go down a path that played down the 
entente with Britain in a display of French diplomatic ‘independence’ intended to 
impress the Americans.  As Chamberlain told the Cabinet, the proposed pact could 
give France a ‘free hand to pursue in Europe policies appearing aggressive in 
American eyes’.68  The only way of preventing that was for the British government to 
ensure that the balance of power remained with all of the Locarno powers, not with 
France. 
Nevertheless, Chamberlain did not simply intend the Locarno powers to act as 
one merely to protect the integrity of the 1925 treaty.  His vision, as Howard told the 
new Foreign Office Assistant Under Secretary, Robert Vansittart, extended beyond 
this.  The Locarno powers were to form a single European bloc of diplomatic power – 
almost with the status of a mini state – with which to negotiate the pact to outlaw war 
with the Americans: to create ‘a bond of union between the United States and 
Europe’.69  In this process, Chamberlain saw little reason why he could not reprise his 
Locarno role of the ‘honest broker’.  That position had placed British interests at the 
heart of the negotiating process in 1925.70  It was arguably even more vital that that 
should be the case in 1928 given Briand’s propensity for negotiating with the 
Americans without Chamberlain at his side.  Nor was Chamberlain prepared to allow 
the Americans to pursue a policy of divide and rule at the expense of Britain and 
France.  No power should ever be in a position to set ‘France and England at 
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loggerheads and destroying the basis of our common policy in Europe’, he told 
Crewe.71 
It is hardly original to claim that Chamberlain was a Francophile.  What has 
perhaps been lost sight of, however, is that his love of France and the French was not 
unquestioning or two-dimensional but varied in degree and intensity while never 
entirely disappearing from view.  Others have also claimed that his relationship with 
Briand is of central importance to understanding Chamberlain’s European diplomacy 
in the mid 1920s.  This is not disputed in this article, but attention has also been 
drawn to the Foreign Secretary’s willingness to take a pragmatic and independent 
view of French foreign policy objectives if they were not entirely consistent with 
British interests.  The first tests of the unity of the Locarno powers revealed a still 
fragile relationship between Britain and France that had not entirely overcome or 
forgiven the tensions of the first five years of peace.  In that context, Chamberlain’s 
efforts changed nothing.  The Locarno treaty was, of course, to be subjected to much 
sterner challenges in the decade that followed, but there was something incongruous 
about Chamberlain’s belief that Briand’s foreign policy should be rooted in European 
affairs, with French global interests forced into a secondary role, when he manifestly 
would not have argued for that for Britain.  In 1904, it was acceptable for France to 
behave as a world power, if that status was not greater than that of Britain or that it 
did not threaten British interests.  By 1929, Britain was less certain that such a 
strategy would work but could not decide whether it was worth the effort to try.  The 
price was a greater British commitment to maintain European security, and, despite 
Chamberlain’s rhetoric at Locarno, that was something even he shied away from after 
1925.  As to whether there was an Entente Cordiale between 1924 and 1928, the 
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answer is that Chamberlain and Briand wanted it to exist, but for different reasons and 
on different terms, and it was for this reason that it was, in effect, unworkable.  
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